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ABSTRACT  
Empirical studies on happiness have found that: a) most people are happy in modern 
nations, b) average happiness in nations is rising, c) inequality in happiness is going 
down, d) happiness depends heavily on the kind of society one lives in, but e) not 
very much on one’s place in society. These remarkable findings are largely ignored 
in sociology, if not denied. This has several reasons. One reason is professional 
bias: most sociologists earn their living dealing with social problems are therefore not 
apt to see that people flourish. Another reason is ideological: many sociologists are 
‘critical’ of modern society and can therefore hardly imagine that people thrive in 
these conditions. Lastly, some sociological theories play them false, in particular 
cognitive theories implying that happiness is relative. These theories and the 
evidence against them are discussed in this paper.  
 
 
1  FINDINGS ON HAPPINESS 
  
Happiness has long been a playground for speculative philosophy, but since the 
1970s it has also become the subject of empirical research. In that research, 
happiness is conceived as overall life-satisfaction and measured using self-reports. 
This conception of happiness has appeared to be sound and this way of 
measurement has been proven valid (Veenhoven 1984, Diener 1999, Donovan et al. 
2003, VanPraag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2010). This research tradition has yielded a 
growing body of knowledge, much is which is gathered in the World Database of 
Happiness (Veenhoven 2013). There are four main findings:  
 
 
Most people are happy  
The earliest investigations on happiness took place in modern western nations and 
observed that most people were happy. This appeared not only in responses to 
questions about life satisfaction, but also in measures of daily mood, such as the 
Bradburn (1969) Affect Balance Scale. An example is presented in figure 1, in which 
the distribution of responses  in Western nations is shown to the following survey 
question: 
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All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as-a-whole these 
days?  
  1        2        3       4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
     dissatisfied           satisfied 
 
     Figure 1 about here 
 
About a quarter of the population in these countries rated 5 or lower on this question, 
while more than half rated their life 7 or higher. The reports may be somewhat 
inflated by desirability, but this bias appears to be marginal (Veenhoven 2008a). The 
validity of these measures is beyond doubt. People understand the concept and 
typically answer such questions properly. 
Responses are not so positive in all countries of the world, but still the 
average is above neutral in most of day’s nations. This can be seen in figure 2, in 
which average happiness in nations all over the world is presented. Of the 148 
nations on this map 37 score lower than 5, while average happiness is 7 or higher in 
35 nations. The world average weighted by population size was 60;  standard 
deviation was 0.9. The world average not weighted by population size (every country 
counted the same) was 5.9;  the standard deviation was 1.3. 
 
    Figure 2 about here 
 
Average happiness is rising  
Since the 1970s happiness has been periodically assessed in most western nations. 
Comparison over time shows an upward trend in most of these nations and few 
cases of decline (Veenhoven 2014 table 3). On figure 3 are some examples.  Trend 
data on non-western nations are less abundant, but show greater gains in 
happiness. This rise in average happiness appears to be linked to economic growth, 
which goes against the famous ‘Easterlin paradox’ (Easterlin 1974; Veenhoven & 
Vergunst 2014).  
  Life-expectancy has also risen considerably in this era and this means that 
this generation has witnessed an unprecedented rise in ‘happy life years’. Americans 
gained 5,2 happy life-years between 1973 and 2010 and Western Europeans about 
3,6 happy life years2.  
 
     Figure 3 about here 
 
Inequality in happiness going down  
This rise in average happiness has been accompanied by a reduction of the 
dispersion of happiness in the general public, which manifests in a lowering of 
standard deviations over time (see figure 4). This reduction is partly due to the rising 
average that causes a concentration of responses at the top of the scale, but not 
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entirely. The lowering of inequality in happiness is also due to a reduction in unhappy 
responses. (Veenhoven 2005). 
 
    Figure 4 about here 
 
1.4 Strong impact of kind of society  
Average happiness differs widely across nations (cf. Figure 2); from  2.6 on a scale 
of 0-10 in Togo to  8.3 in Denmark. There appears to be a pattern  in these 
differences. Happiness is systematically higher in nations that combine a good 
material standard of living with good governance, freedom and a climate of 
tolerance(see figure 5). Together, such societal characteristics explain about 75% of 
the differences in average happiness across nations (Ott 2005). There are also 
societal characteristics that appeared to be unrelated to average happiness of 
citizens. This is the case for income inequality in nations (Berg  & Veenhoven 2010) 
and for state welfare effort (Veenhoven 2000).  
 
    Figure 5 about here 
 
Little impact of place in society 
Several surveys on happiness have been done in the context of marketing research 
for the welfare state and aimed at identifying client groups. Investigators expected 
social deprivation to be accompanied by unhappiness, which would legitimize policy 
intervention. Yet they found little correlation between happiness and income position 
and between happiness and the level of education of an individual. Together, social 
positional variables explain at best 10% of the differences in happiness found within 
nations3. At least in modern affluent nations, happiness depends far more on 
embedding in intimate networks and on psychological characteristics (e.g. Headey & 
Wearing 1992).  
 
 
2  RECEPTION IN SOCIOLOGY  
 
There are good reasons to expect that these findings would  attract considerable 
attention in sociology. One reason is that the subject was on the agenda of the 19th 
century founding fathers of sociology, such as Auguste Comte (Ple 2000) and 
Herbert Spencer (1857). 
  Another reason to expect avid interest is that these findings involve answers 
to long-standing questions in sociology, the finding that most people are happy is 
indicative of how livable modern society is; the finding that happiness is rising 
embodies an answer to the question of social progress; the finding that inequality in 
happiness is going down is telling about the relevance of ‘new’ social inequalities 
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and the finding that happiness differs so much across kinds of societies is highly 
relevant in the debate of what a good society is like. 
  Still another reason to expect close attention is that some of the findings flatly 
contradict some common beliefs. The finding that inequality of happiness has 
diminished during the last decades contradicts the common notion that inequality is 
rising in modern societies. Likewise, the finding that income inequality in nations is 
unrelated to average happiness contradicts the commonly held belief that socio-
economic disparities cause deep frustration. The same holds for the finding that the 
effects of income and education are small. 
Yet the reality is that these findings are not acknowledged in sociology. This 
appears in the following examples: 
 
Not mentioned in textbooks  
The subject of happiness is typically absent in sociological textbooks. For instance 
the word does not appear in the subject index of the introductory books by written by 
Giddens (2006), Marsh et al (1996) and Newman (1997). These books do mention 
negative mental states such as anomie and alienation and do contain sections on (ill) 
health. A notable exception is the introduction to macro-sociology by Nolan and 
Lenski (2006) where happiness is discussed in the context of social progress. 
 
Missing in Dictionary of Sociology 
The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, 2nd edition, does not include happiness, 
subjective well-being, or quality of life as a keyword (Johnson 2002) . 
 
Marginal in sociological journals 
The subject of happiness is only rarely addressed in sociological journals. This 
appears from an analysis of the publications listed in the Bibliography of the earlier 
mentioned World Database of Happiness, which contains some 9000 scientific 
publications on happiness. 
  From this source I selected texts published in a disciplinary source, searching 
on ‘economic’, psychologic’ and ‘sociologic’. The number of publications on 
happiness in each of these three disciplines over the years is presented on figure 6. 
As one can see, psychologists addressed the subject already in the early 1900s and 
increased their attention since the 1960. Economists stepped in later, but happiness 
economics is now booming. The first sociological publications on happiness appear 
in the 1950s and the number has hardly increased since. 
  In an earlier version of this paper I had used disciplinary abstract systems and 
counted the percentage of abstracts in which the words ‘happiness’ or ‘life-
satisfaction’ were used. Yet such counts are misleading for two reasons. One is that 
these words do not always fit the concept at hand here. A problem particular to 
sociology is that the abstract system cover more that core sociological journals. Most 
hits come from two niche journals, Social Indicators Research and the Journal of 
Happiness Studies. One of the reasons I started this latter journal in 2000 was that 
mainstream sociological journals rejected my papers on happiness.  
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  An advantage of using the Bibliography of Happiness is that this source limits 
to publications on happiness in the sense of an individual’s subjective enjoyment of 
his/her life as a whole. All texts have been read to see whether this subject is 
addressed and publications on other things called happiness were left out. 
 
    Figure 6 about here 
 
Missing in sociological discourse on ‘quality of life’  
Still, the term ‘quality-of-life’ is not unknown in sociology. There are symposia under 
that name and also research institutes. Yet subjective enjoyment of life is typically 
not at stake in these contexts, quality-of-life being typically conceived as the degree 
to which life meets apriori standards of wellbeing. The 16th World Congress of 
Sociology provides a nice illustration: the conference theme was: ‘The quality of 
social existence in a globalizing world’ and the issues discussed in this context were 
conditions deemed beneficial, such as social identity, social cohesion and social 
mobility. Subjective appreciation of life in these conditions was markedly absent from 
the thematic sessions of this conference.  
 
Lost in a preoccupation with misery 
As noted above, sociology deals with problems in the first place. This appears for 
instance in the use of the word ‘satisfaction’ in sociological abstracts; in 41% of the 
abstracts that word is used to denote a negative state, that is, dissatisfaction, while 
in only 8% the word is used for a positive appreciation4. Analysis of the sociological 
abstracts over time has also shown an increasing use of negative words such as 
‘fear’ and ’crime’ over the last decade (Elchardus et al. 2005). This narrowing of the 
focus on misery contrasts with the above mentioned findings of rising levels of 
happiness in nations.  
 
The above general indications of disinterest fit my personal experience as a 
sociologist working on happiness since the 1970s. Colleague sociologist in funding 
and  journals were skeptical about the subject and rejected most of my applications 
and submissions, typically with arguments mentioned in section 4 of this paper. This 
was one of the reasons why I started the Journal of Happiness Studies in 2000. I 
also met skepticism in my department of sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Though the output  of my research was welcomed, the topic was not seen as 
sociological and remained marginal in the research program. The department 
decided not to continue research on happiness after my time and for that reason I 
moved to the department of economics of Erasmus University, where a research 
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organization on Happiness Economics5 was established in 2012. 
 
3  REASONS FOR NEGLECT  
 
Why do sociologists overlook this matter? I see three kinds of reasons: pragmatic, 
ideological and theoretical. 
 
Pragmatic  
Sociologists are more interested in what people do than in how they feel. Their main 
objective is to explain social behavior and happiness is at best a variable in that 
context. A related point is that sociology is about collectivities, while happiness is an 
individual level concept. A further pragmatic reason is that sociologists earn their 
living dealing with social problems. So, if they look at subjective well being at all, they 
focus on ill being in the first place6. 
 
Ideological 
 Many sociologists are committed to notions of objective wellbeing, such as social 
equality and social cohesion. They are therefore not eager to investigate how people 
actually feel in such conditions, and when they do, they often ignore contradictory 
results. For instance, when people appear to feel subjectively good in conditions 
deemed to be objectively bad, this is easily disposed of as 'social desirability bias' or 
‘false consciousness'. 
 
Theoretical 
Sociologists tend to think of happiness as a mere idea that depends on social 
comparison with variable standards and that is, therefore, a whimsical state of mind, 
not worth pursuing and hence not worth studying. Below I will consider these views 
in more detail. 
 
4 VIEWS ON HAPPINESS IN SOCIOLOGY 
Sociologists are not specialized in matters of the mind, but still make psychological 
assumptions. They typically borrow from cognitive psychology, probably because 
that line of thought fits with their view on man as a socially determined being. In this 
line, sociologists see happiness as a cognitive ‘construct’ shaped by collective 
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notions of the good life and as the result of comparisons, social comparison in 
particular.  
 
4.1 Presumed social construction of happiness 
Social construction theory is about how we make sense of things. It assumes that we 
'construct' mental representations, using collective notions as building blocks. In this 
view, happiness is regarded as a social construction, comparable to notions like 
'beauty' and 'fairness'. A common reasoning in this line is that happiness depends on 
shared notions about life and that these collective notions frame individual 
appraisals. 
  One of the ways this is assumed to work is seeing the glass half full or half 
empty, optimistic cultures tending to highlight the positive aspects of life, while 
pessimistic cultures emphasize its shortcomings. Americans have been mentioned 
as an example of the former view and the French of the latter, e.g. by Ostroot & 
Scheider (1985). In this line Inglehart (1990:30) has suggested that happiness is 
lower in France than in the US because life was harder in France for earlier 
generations, and this is echoed in a more pessimistic outlook on life today. 
  Another cognitive mechanism assumed to gear happiness is comparison with 
shared notions of the good life. In this view, happiness is the gap between 
perceptions of life-as-it -is with notions of how-life-should-be. In this line it is 
commonly argued that the advertising industry reduces our wellbeing, because it 
fosters dreams of a life that is out of reach for the common man (Layard 2005). 
Another example of this view is the claim that the high levels of happiness in modern 
nations result from giving up hope for a better life. 
  An additional mechanism that has been mentioned is that we see ourselves 
typically though the eyes of others and hence also judge our happiness though their 
eyes. In this view, happiness is a 'reflected appraisal'. We will be positive about our 
life when people around us deem us to be well off and negative when others see us 
as losers. In this vein the lower happiness among singles has been explained as the 
result of a negative stereotype: because singles are 'labeled' as pitiful they come to 
see themselves as miserable, in spite of the apparent advantages of single living 
(e.g. Davies & Strong 1977). 
  The constructionist view implies that there is little value to happiness, 
happiness being a mere idea. Since notions about the good life vary across time and 
culture, happiness is also seen to be culturally relative. A life that is deemed perfect 
in one idea of the good life may be seen to be a failure from perspective. For this 
reason this theory is popular among the critics of Bentham’s (1789) moral 
philosophy, i.e. that we should aim at “greater happiness for a greater number”; it 
reduces happiness to something insignificant. 
Theoretical plausibility  
It is beyond doubt that shared notions frame much of our appraisals, yet this is not to 
say that all awareness is socially constructed. We need no shared notions to 
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experience pain or hunger; culture at best modifies our reflection on these 
experiences somewhat. Our understanding draws also on external stimuli and on 
inner signals. The question thus is: How does this work in the case of happiness? 
  When striking the balance of their life, people appear to use their mood as the 
prime source of information (Schwartz & Strack 1991) and consequently overall 
happiness correlates typically stronger with hedonic level of affect than with 
contentment. There is logic in this, since the affect system is evolutionary older and 
serves to ascertain that an organism’s basic needs are met. The cognitive system 
developed on top of this in homo sapiens, but it has not replaced the affective 
system. It is rather an additional device that allows better learning from experience 
and planning of activities. In this light it is unlikely that happiness is merely due to 
cognitive appraisal. I have discussed this view in more detail in Veenhoven 2009. 
 
Empirical support  
The reality value of this view cannot be tested as such, because the human mind is 
still a black box. Yet we can check its aptness indirectly, when we consider the 
implications of the theory that happiness is a mere social construction. 
 
Culture specific?  
One implication is that conditions for happiness will be variable across cultures. If 
happiness is a culture specific construct, its determinants will also be culturally 
specific. Hence empirical studies on correlates of happiness must show considerable 
cultural variation and hardly any universal pattern. Yet the available data show 
otherwise.  
  Comparison of average happiness across nations reveals a common pattern. 
Happiness is systematically higher in nations that provide a decent material standard 
of living, that are politically democratic and well governed and where the cultural 
climate is characterized by trust and tolerance. Together objective societal 
characteristics explain about 75% of the differences in happiness across nations 
(Veenhoven & Kalmijn 2005).  
  Comparison of correlations within nations also shows much similarity. In all 
countries, the married appear to be happier than singles (Diener, 2000) and health is 
also a strong correlate of happiness all over the world, both physical health and 
mental health. Likewise, the differences in happiness across age and gender are 
typically small everywhere (Veenhoven 2010) 
 
Variable over time?  
A second implication is that happiness must be variable over time. If happiness 
depends on shared notions of the good life, it will vary with fads about that matter 
and this must be reflected in erratic movements in average happiness in nations, 
comparable to changes in political preferences and tastes for music. Yet again this 
not what the data show. Average happiness appears to be very stable over time, at 
least in western nations over the last 30 years, where happiness has risen slightly 
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without many fluctuations (cf. section 1.2). Follow-up studies at the individual level 
also show considerable constancy over time (Erhardt et. al. 2000). 
 
Inconsequential?  
A third implication is that happiness is of little consequence. If happiness is sheer 
cognitive spin, based on fashionable ideas, it will not matter much whether it turns 
out positively or negatively. Happiness is then a petty appraisal, such as a person’s 
preference for one kind of wallpaper or another; nice in itself but of no consequence 
for anything more than that. 
  Once more, this appears not to be the case. Happiness appears to go hand in 
hand with objective thriving and follow-up studies have shown that happiness is a 
strong predictor of physical health and longevity (e.g. Danner et. al 2000, Veenhoven 
2008b). 
 
Together, these findings do not support the theory that happiness is mere thought 
silk.   Note that these findings concern happiness-as-such, and not opinions about 
what adds to happiness. Happiness-as-such is something that we experience 
ourselves and which we can appraise without the help of others. Though we know 
how we feel, we often do not know why and in attributing grounds for our wellbeing 
we draw more on a shared view. In this respect happiness is comparable to a 
headache: a headache-as-such is not a social construction, it is an autonomous 
signal from the body. Yet our interpretations of what gives us a headache depend 
very much on hearsay.  
 
4.2 Presumed product of social comparison 
All sociologists learn in their student days about the exemplary case of ‘relative 
deprivation’ described in Stouffer's (1949) classic study ‘The American Soldier’. One 
of the things assessed in this study is the satisfaction with promotion chances and 
contrary to expectation the satisfaction with this aspect of army life appeared to be 
higher in units where promotion chances were low, such as the military police, than 
in units where promotion chances were high, such as the air force. This 
phenomenon was explained in terms of social comparison; because promotion was 
more common in the air force, air force personnel more often felt they were entitled 
to promotion. This case of satisfaction with promotion makes many sociologists think 
that all satisfaction depends on social comparison. 
  Social comparison theory is a variant of a wider comparison theory that links 
up with the above mentioned notion that happiness is the difference between life-as-
it-is and how-life-should-be. The smaller these discrepancies are, the higher the 
happiness is assumed to be. In this theory there can be multiple discrepancies; 
among other things discrepancies between what one has and what one thinks that 
one could have, and discrepancies between what one has and what one feels 
entitled to (Michalos 1985). Perceptions of what one could have and what would be 
fair to have are seen to be drawn from social comparison. In this view, happiness is 
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a matter of keeping up with the Joneses; we feel well if we do better and bad if we do 
worse than those we compare ourselves to. 
  In this theory there is little hope for achieving greater happiness for a greater 
number, since improving the living conditions for all will also improve the life of the 
Jones’s, leaving the relative differences as before. Social comparison is one of the 
mechanisms in the idea that we are on a ‘hedonic treadmill’ that presumably nullifies 
all progress (Brickman & Campbell 1971) and it is the main mechanism in Easterlin’s 
(1974) theory that economic growth does not add to happiness. In this view we can 
at best mitigate the effects of social comparison somewhat if we make the 
differences less visible. In this line Frank (1999) has advised that conspicuous 
consumption should be discouraged with heavy taxes on luxury goods and Layard 
(2005) recommends taxing high incomes more. Limiting advertisement is also 
suggested in this context, in particular commercials that use pictures of a life that is 
out of reach of the common man. 
 
Theoretical plausibility  
There are several problems with this psychological theory. First it is clear that social 
comparison does not apply to all subjective appraisals. When I hit my finger with a 
hammer, I feel pain and my finger does not hurt less if my neighbor Jones does the 
same thing. When appraising our situation, we use various sources of information, 
and social comparison is only one of these. 
  This brings us to the question of what value social comparison could be for 
assessing how well one lives. Obviously, that value is limited to aspects of life where 
social comparison is possible, such as your income, but not to less visible aspects 
such your sex life or the pleasure you take from watching a sunset. Even where we 
can measure up to the Jones this evidently informs us about what is possible in life, 
but not necessarily about what is desirable or enjoyable. Looking over the fence of 
my neighbor Jones I can see that I lag behind in the number of beer cans emptied, 
but this does not tell me whether I would be better off if I drank more. Advocates of 
social comparison theory would retort that we compare only on things that are 
socially valued in society, such as money and fame, and this links up with the 
assumption that notions of the good life are socially constructed. Yet even if beer 
drinking  were highly valued in my society, and if I wholeheartedly supported that 
value, I would end up less well if I drank more than my dipsomaniacal neighbor 
Jones. That is evident because drinking too much is bad for the body, irrespective of 
how I think about this. 
  This example illustrates a major flaw in comparison theory: it forgets that we 
are biological organisms. Obviously we cannot feel well if our body is harmed. 
Affective alarms start to ring when we do not get enough food or when our 
temperature falls too low. Less obvious, but no less present are psychological needs, 
such as the need to belong and to use and develop our potentials. We feel bad when 
lonely and bored when unchallenged. Humans are not born as tabula rasa, on which 
socialization imprints culture specific wants, we are pre-wired to need some things 
and as a result feel good when these needs are met. 
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  In this respect we are very much like our fellow animals. Dogs and cats can 
also feel good or bad and evidently do not calculate their happiness by comparing 
shared standards of the good life. Evolution has simply programmed them to feel 
good or bad subjectively in situations that are good or bad for their survival 
objectively. Our affective system is not much different from that of dogs and cats, 
and also serves to make us do intuitively what is good for us. Human cognition has 
developed on top of this affective program and allows us to reflect on affective 
signals and even to ignore them to some extent. Yet this is not to say that cognition 
has replaced affective experience. Without affective information we are conatively 
blind as Damasio (1994) has showed in his studies of brain injuries. Hence without 
affective information we will also be unable to appraise the quality of our life. 
  I have discussed this alternative ‘need theory’7 of happiness elsewhere 
(Veenhoven 1995, 2009) and Ed Diener has reviewed the strong and weak points of 
this view (Diener et. al. 2000). Though alien to mainstream sociology, this latter view 
on happiness would fit socio-biology; however, to my knowledge this field of 
sociology has not yet considered the issue. 
 
Empirical support 
Social comparison is at best one piece of information in appraisals of happiness and 
it is an empirical question how much it matters. We can see how much when 
considering some implications of the theory. 
  One testable implication of social comparison theory is that people will 
typically be neither positive nor negative about their life. If we feel good because we 
do better than the Jones, the Jones must feel bad because they do not so well. This 
must manifest in an average around neutral in general population samples. Yet 
survey data do not support this prediction, average happiness being far above 
neutral in modern nations. 
    Another implication is that happiness must be higher among people who do 
well on socially valued standards. This is not always the case however. Though 
people in high status jobs are typically happier than people in low status 
occupations, there is no correlation between happiness and level of education. 
Likewise, there is only modest correlation between happiness and income and this 
correlation is at least partly due to an effect of the former on the latter, happiness 
adding to earning chances. See respectively correlational findings on happiness and 
Occupation8, Education9 and Income10 in the World Database of Happiness.  
  However, happiness does appear to depend on things that have little to do 
with social comparison, such as participation in voluntary organizations11, intimate 
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ties12 and being an extraverted and conscientious person13. 
 
 
5  CONCLUSION 
 
Happiness is a relevant subject for sociology, in particular for comparative sociology. 
Yet happiness is a neglected subject in sociology. The main reason seems to be that 
common sociological theories continue to prevent us taking a proper perspective on 
the matter. 
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Figure 1 
Life-satisfaction in western nations 2005-2008 
 
Data: World Values Survey, round 5, 2005-2008. Pooled probability samples of 18+ aged general 
public in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Finland, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, New 
Zealand, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, United States, 
Luxembourg. Reported in Daly et al. 2011 
  
14 
 
Figure 2 
Average happiness around the world 
 
 
 
Source: World Database of Happiness, collection Happiness in Nations  
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Figure 3  
Trend of average happiness in some developed nations since 1970 
 
 
Data: World Database of Happiness (WDH 2014), Data file Trends in Nations 
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Figure 4  
Trend of inequality of happiness in 9 EU nations, Japan and the USA 
 
 
 
Data: World Database of Happiness (WDH 2014), Data file Trend in Nations  
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Figure 5  
Average happiness and modernity in nations in 2000 
 
Data; World Database of happiness, Data file States of Nations  
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Figure 6  
Trend of publications on happiness in different scientific specializations 
 
 
Source: World Database of Happiness, Bibliography 
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